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An Issue Ripe For Supreme Court Review: Whether Congress
Intended to Alter the Common Law Principles of Corporate
Limited Liability When Enacting CERCLA
by Constance S. Chandler and Rebecca J. Grosser
L INTRODUCTION
In 1980, Congress enacted
the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability
Act ("CERCLA").' CERCLA was
intended to address the inadequacies
of prior environmental legislation.2
Congress' fundamental purposes in
enacting CERCLA were: "(1) to
provide for clean-up if a hazardous
substance is released into the
environment or if such release is
threatened, and (2) to hold
responsible parties liable for the costs
of these clean-ups."' The statute aims
to achieve prompt cleanup of
hazardous waste sites by placing the
ultimate financial responsibility for
cleanup on those responsible for the
pollution.'
The concept of limited
liability was established to insulate
corporate owners from the risks
associated with owning a business,
thereby, allowing commerce and free
enterprise to flourish.' Unless
otherwise provided for in the state
constitution, a statute or the corporate
charter, "stockholders are not
personally liable for wrongful
corporate conduct unless they
participate therein" either actively or
passively.' Corporate directors and
officers also receive similar
protection.' Likewise, a parent
corporation is typically regarded as an
entity distinct from its subsidiaries. A
parent is protected from the liabilities
of its subsidiary by the corporate veil
unless circumstances require that the
veil be pierced and that the corporate
form be disregarded. Parent liability
generally occurs only when a parent
actively controls or dominates the
subsidiary.'
When considering the
liability of parent corporations for the
environmental torts of their
subsidiaries, the issue is often
whether the applicable standard of
liability derives from direct application
of the statutory definitions of
CERCLA or from common law
principles of corporate law.' Under
the direct liability theory, the parent is
directly liable under CERCLA
provided that it exercised sufficient
control over the subsidiary to classify
itself as an "operator." Under the
indirect liability theory, a court can
only hold a parent corporation liable
when the facts support a piercing of
the corporate veil.'o
Currently, a conflict exists
between federal appellate courts as to
which standard of liability is
applicable. For example, in United
States v. Cordova Chemical Company
of Michigan," the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
determined that a parent corporation
is liable for the environmental
contamination of a site owned by its
subsidiary only if facts exist which
allow the corporate veil to be pierced.
With this opinion, the Sixth Circuit
adopted the narrow view of liability
for parent corporations expressed by
the Fifth Circuit, but it disagreed with
the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits. Cordova highlights the
differing opinions on whether
Congress intended to alter the
common law principles of corporate





owners have been protected by
limited liability." Limited liability is
considered a fundamental
characteristic of the corporate form."
Corporate owners are typically
regarded as entities distinct from the
corporation itself, and are protected
from its liabilities by the corporate veil
unless circumstances require that the
veil be pierced and that the corporate
form be disregarded.
In 1980, Congress enacted
CERCLA in an effort to address
perceived inadequacies of earlier
environmental legislation. 4 CERCLA
'42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1995).
U.S. v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp 1249, 1252 (S.D.ll. 1984), discussing the Resource Conservation & Recovery Act
(RCRA).
I H.R. Rep. No. 253 (III), 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3038.
4 J.V. Peters & Co. v. Administrator, 767 F.2d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 1985).
5 Lynda J. Oswald and Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the "Erosion" of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. REv.
259, 262 (1992).
6 18 CJ.S. Corporations § 427 (1990).
19 CJ.S. Corporations § 544 (1990).
Oswald and Schipani, supra note 5, at 302.
9 ld. at 301.
'
0Brown, infra note 187, at 821.
"59 F.3d 584 (61 Cir. 1995), vacated reh'g, en banc, granted, 67 E3d 586, (6th Cir. 1995).
'
2See, infra note 172.
"Oswald and Schipani, supra note 5, at 262.
14Id.
14 MELPR
contains three mechanisms designed
to rectify the regulatory weaknesses
of earlicr legislation. 5 First, the
Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has the power to react to
hazardous substances that pose an
"imminent and substantial danger" to
the public by seeking an injunction or
by implementing a cleanup program.'
Second, CERCLA provides for strict,
joint and several liability directing that
those responsible for environmental
contamination be held financially
accountable for cleanup costs."
Finally, Congress created the
"Superfund," which is a trust fund
used by the EPA to cover the
expenses associated with the
immediate cleanup of hazardous
substances prior to contribution by
the responsible parties who are unable
to pay the costs of cleanup or cannot
be found."
Congress enacted CERCLA
to promote the cleanup of hazardous
and potentially hazardous waste
sites. 9 CERCLA is enforced by
requiring polluters to pay for expenses
associated with cleanup of the
pollution." CERCLA liability attaches
if: (I) a release has occurred, (2) at a
facility, (3) causing a plaintiff to incur
response costs, and (4) the defendant
is a responsible party as defined
under section 107(a)." There are four
bases for imposing liability: present
ownership or operation of a hazardous
waste disposal site,2 past ownership
or operation when the hazardous
substance was disposed," the
generation of hazardous waste,2 4 or
the transportation of such waste.2s
"Owner or operator means...any
person owning or operating such
facility ...,"6 and "person" is defined
broadly to include a firm, corporation,
or commercial entity, among other
things."
Section 107(a) may attach to
a corporate owner in two ways. The
first basis for liability of a corporate
owner is direct liability under the
"operator" language of CERCLA's
section 107(a)." The second basis for
liability is through common law veil-
piercing. 9
Veil-piercing may occur when
a corporate owner is found to have
formed a corporation to perpetrate a
fraud or when an owner is found to
have dominated the corporation." For
example, the courts will disregard the
corporate form when it is found that a
subsidiary was formed for an illegal,
fraudulent, or unjust purpose.' In
addition, the courts may pierce the
corporate veil under the "alter ego"
theory." A two-pronged test is
applied to determine whether peircing
is appropriate under this theory." The
test requires: "(I) that there be such
unity of interest and ownership that
the separate personalities of the
corporation and the individual no
longer exist and (2) that, if the acts are
treated as those of the corporation
alone, an inequitable result will
follow."" The first prong may be
satisfied by a showing of domination
and control of the corporation by the
corporate owner." Factors used to
determine domination include stock
ownership, identity of officers and






'Tippins v. USX Corp., 37 F.3d 87, 92 (31' Cir 1994).
"U.S. v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 259 (3d Cir. 1992).
142 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
2 CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) imposes liability upon the owner and operator of a vessel or facility
2CERCLA § 107(a)(2), § 9607(a)(2) applies to any person who at the time of the disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed.
"CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) defines a generator as "any person who by contract, agreement or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances owned or
possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances[.J"
25A transporter is "any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities,
incineration vessels or sites selected by such person[.]" CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
'-42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii).
2742 U.S.C. §9601(21).
uCordova, 59 F.3d at 589.
"Id.





-'Autonotriz del Golfode Califomia v. Resnick, 306 P.2d 1, at 3 (1957).
"Oswald and Schipani, supra note 5, at 296.
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responsibility for day-to-day
operations, arrangements for payment
of salaries and expenses, and the
origin of the corporation's business
assets.
Corporate officers and
directors are personally liable for torts
committed by them, whether or not the
tortious act was performed in an
official capacity." In addition, under
the doctrine of respondeat superior, if
an officer is acting on behalf of the
corporation in the commission of the
tort, both the corporation and the
individual may be held liable."
Supposing the officer or director is
also a shareholder of the corporation,
the individual liability imposed is not
based on the liability derived from a
piercing of the corporate veil."
Rather, the liability is based upon the
officer's participation, direction,
knowledge or acquiescence in the
tort" and is imposed on the
individual's status not as an owner of
the corporation, but as an employee."
B. Judicial Background
1. Officer and Director Liability
Courts have developed three
tests for determining if personal
liability of a director or officer is
justified: authority to control,
personal participation, and
prevention."2 The authority to control
test adopted by the Second and Ninth
Circuits43 relies on whether or not the
officer had the authority or the ability
to direct the corporation's actions
with regard to the CERCLA violation
rather than active involvement in the
breach." The personal participation
(or actual control) test requires that
the officer or director have personally
participated in the CERCLA
violation."5 This theory has been
adopted by the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of
Appeals." The final test creates an
incentive for corporate officers to
involve themselves in environmental
decision-making because the test
weighs any efforts taken by
individuals to avoid or alleviate the
harm, whether or not successful,
before assessing liabilty.7 Liability
will be imposed if an "individual in a
close corporation could have
prevented or significantly abated the
release of hazardous substances.""
The Twelfth and Thirteenth Circuits
have not adopted the authority to
control, personal participation, or
prevention test for officer liability.
a. Authority to Control
First, some courts have
developed and imposed an authority
to control standard of liability." This
standard was adopted by the court in
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper &
Sons Co.- In this case, plaintiff
Nurad sought to impose § I 07(a)(2)
liability upon previous tenants of a
waste disposal site.s' The lease
agreements did not authorize the
tenants to use the portions of the site
that the court found to be the
contaminated areas." The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused
to impose operator liability upon these
tenants because they had no
authority to exercise control over the
contaminated area." Specifically, the
court upheld the district court's
proposition that although one need
not exercise actual control to invoke
operator liability, it is necessary that
the authority to control is present."
The authority to control
standard was also the basis of
"Id. at 302-304. In Missouri, to peirce the corporate veil, the corporation must be controlled and influenced by perosns or another
corporation, evidence must establish that the corporate identity was used to defeat a public convenience, to justify a wrong, or to
perpetrate a fraud, and th ewrong must be proximate cause fo injury to third persons who dealt with the corporation. Edward D.
Gevers Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. R. Webbe Corp., 885 S.W. 2d 771 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
113A W. Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATION § 1135 (rev. ed. 1986).
"Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3"' Cir. 1978).
"Oswald and Schipani, supra note 5, at 274."Id.
41 d.
21d. at 275, 282, and 291.
43See e.g. State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, (2d Cir. 1985) and Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corporation v.
Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1992), both imposing operator liability.
"Oswald and Schipani, supra note 5, at 282.
45Id. at 275.
"See e.g. U.S. v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992), Riverside Mkt. Dev. Corp. v. Int'l Bldg. Products, Inc., 931
F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1991), Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Piperfitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 1994) imposing operator
liability; U.S. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1987), Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bemuth
Corp., 996 F.2d 1107 (11 th Cir. 1993), imposing generator liability.
471d. at 291.
"Kelley v. ARCO Indus. Corp., 723 F. Supp 1214, 1220 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
"Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1220-21 (3"' Cir. 1993).






imposing liability upon a stockholder
and officer in State of New York v.
Shore Realty Corp.' In Shore Realty,
the Second Circuit relied on
§9601(20)(A)-"' to imply that a
managing and owning stockholder is
liable as an owner or operator under
CERCLA." Defendant LeoGrande
was the officer and stockholder of
Shore Realty Corporation, the
corporate owner of the hazardous
waste storage site.s" Although
LeoGrande did not personally own the
hazardous disposal site and the
disposal had occurred prior to Shore
Realty ownership, he was found
personally liable because his position
placed him in control of the facility
operation when the hazardous
substance was released into the
environment. 9
b. Personal Participation
The second test developed
by courts for determining if personal
liablity of a director or officer is
justified is the personal participation
standard. In United States v. Ward,"
the court imposed liability upon the
corporate officers who participated in
arranging for the hazardous waste
disposal."' However, the court did not
impose liability upon officers who had
personally arranged for disposal but
did not know the exact location of
disposal.12 Allowing corporate
officers who have authorized and
participated in the generation of
hazardous substances, but do not
know the location of the site to escape
liability is contrary to the purposes of
CERCLAP This exception would
allow an otherwise responsible
generator to walk away from its
destruction by "closing their eyes to
the method in which their hazardous
wastes are disposed."" The Eighth
Circuit subscribed to this same test in
United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc.
(NEPACCO II).6 In NEPACCO I,1 the
court found Lee a shareholder and
officer liable under §107(a)(3) as a
generator because he "had the
responsibility to and did arrange for
the disposal of hazardous waste." 7
Lee's role in the disposal of the
hazardous waste was to prescribe the
desired characteristics of a disposal
site to Ray, the plant manager." Ray
visited the site and reported his
findings to Lee.' This particular site
was the site involved in the case.'
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit noted
the strict liability imposed on
generators under CERCLA" and
upheld Lee's liability for his role in
arranging for the disposal of the
hazardous waste.n The Court
emphasized that Lee was liable not as
a shareholder, but due to his actual,
personal participation in the disposal
of hazardous substances."
In addition to creating
generator liability, the personal
participation test has also been used
as a standard for imposing transporter
liability." In U.S. v. USX, suit was
brought against USX Corporation, the
principal shareholders and directors,
White and Carite, and three other
affiliated companies.' One of the
White-Carite companies
acknowledged the dispatch of trucks
containing 55-gallon drums of
hazardous waste to a site now
contaminated with the same
substance contained within the
drums." The Third Circuit held that
the district court's use of "an
authority to control" standard for the
ssShore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1052.
5642 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1995) excludes from the definition of owner or operator, a stockholder who does not manage the
corporation.
"Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1052.
"'Id. at 1037.
1Id. at 1037-39. See also United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992) and Bowen Eng'g v. Estate
of Reeve, 799 F.Supp. 467,473-74 (D.N.J. 1992).




I United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726,743 (8th Cir. 1986) (NEPACCO II), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 848 (1987).





7NEPACCO 11, 810 F.2d at 743.
72Id.
7Id. at 744.
74United States v. USX, 68 F.3d 811 (3d Cir. 1995).
75Id. at 815. In addition, suit was filed against three other companies in which White and Carite were the sole shareholders
or were wholly owned affiliates of White-Carite owned companies companies. Id. at 816.
11Id. The hazardous substance leaked from the drums, causing soil and groundwater contamination. Id.
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imposition of transporter liability upon § 107(a)(4) to impose liability upon the following factors for
White and Carite was in error, and "owners or operators of a consideration: authority to control
remanded the case for further transporter.1 4  waste handling practices,
determination using an actual With this standard, the USX responsibility undertaken for waste
participation test." Court asserted toenforce §107(a)(4) disposal practices, responsibility
In reaching its holding, the consistent with traditional concepts of neglected and affirmative attempts to
court echoed the established principle limited shareholder liability. However, prevent unlawful hazardous waste
of limited liability for corporate the holding was not limited to those disposal." Once the court determines
officers who do not participate in the transporters who personally that the individual was in a position to
liability-creating conduct.'l The court participated in the transportation of prevent the environmental harm, the
felt that this principle is inherent in hazardous substances." Rather, if the court weighs any efforts taken to
CERCLA, thus Congress must have officer is aware of the acceptance of avoid or alleviate the harm, whether or
intended to limit liability to those who materials for transport and of the not successful, in assessing the
control the day-to-day operations of company's substantial participation in officer's IiabiIity.9 1
the corporation." The USX Court the selection of the disposal site, he or d. Summary
rejected the proposition that the same she would be liable under §107(a)(4)." In summary, the goal of the
standard of liability should apply to Furthermore, if the officer who had the prevention test is to persuade
generators, operators, and authority to make the disposal corporate officers to become involved
transporters as corporate officers decision, had actual knowledge that with hazardous waste disposal
under § 107(a) because CERCLA's another had made the disposal decisions." he ARCO court stated
language does not permit traditional selection, and acquiesced in the that the prevention test furthers
concepts of limited liability to be decision, he or she would be CERCLA's purposes by encouraging
ignored." The concept of limited individually liable. officers to become increasingly
corporate liability was judicially c. Prevention responsible as their corporate
established at the time CERCLA was The third test for the responsibilities increase,93 rather than
enacted, and actual participation in imposition of liability upon corporate closing their eyes to potential
the wrongful conduct was required."' officers is prevention. Under this violations.
Normal rules of statutory construction standard, liability will be imposed if an The personal participation
dictate that Congress must "individual in a close corporation test is consistent with traditional
specifically state an intent to change a could have prevented or significantly corporate law doctrines. 95
judicial rule." Congress did not abated the release of hazardous Traditionally, for an officer to be liable
specify that shareholders are to be substances."m In Kelley v. ARGO for tortious acts, he or she must be
personally liable for releases of Industries, the court rejected the strict personally involved.' The actual
hazardous substances from disposal liability imposed by CERCLA, stating control test implemented by the courts
sites selected by their companies.' it was too harsh to impose across the for CERCLA liability is analogous to




C alod. at 824.
811d.






"'ARCO, 723 F. Supp. at 1220.
"'Id. at 1219.
901d.
9 m1d. at 1220.
9 coswald and Schipani, supra note 5, at 292.
91ARCO, 723 F.Supp. at 1220.
94d. The court argues that this is the result obtained under the actual control test.
"iOswald and Schipani, supra note 5, at 282.
atSupra note 7.
9slswald and Schipani, supra note 5, at 282.
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On the surface, it seems as if
the authority to control test relaxes
traditional liability by requiring less
than personal participation in the
CERCLA violation to impose personal
liability.9" Upon further examination, it
would be discovered that courts have
not applied the test in such a
manner.9" The courts have required
more than general managerial control
of the corporation, looking for control
of the hazardous waste disposal
decisions." Also, the imposition of
liability upon an officer who has the
authority to control, but fails to do so
is consistent with traditional corporate
law doctrines.""
2. Parent Corporation Liability
Courts have found parent
corporations liable for the
environmental torts of its subsidiaries
based on one of two theories. The
first basis for liability is through
common law veil-piercing. The
second basis for liability of a parent
corporation is direct liability under the
"operator" language of CERCLA's
§ 107(a). Courts imposing this theory
are in conflict about the level of
involvement the parent corporation
must exercise over the subsidiary.
Some courts hold that a parent's
capacity to control the subsidiary's
activities is enough, while others hold
that the parent must exercise actual
control over the subsidiary."
a. Indirect Liability
In Joslyn Manufacturing Co.
v. TL. James & Co., the Fifth Circuit
became the first federal appellate court
to address the liability of parent
corporations for the environmental
torts of its subsidiaries."' There, the
current owner filed action to hold a
parent corporation liable under
CERCLA for actions of its subsidiary,
a former owner of the site.'"' The
Joslyn court held that CERCLA did
not impose direct liability on parent
corporations for violation of their
wholly owned subsidiaries."' Thus,
the Fifth Circuit adopted a narrow
view of liability for parent
corporations.
In the Joslyn decision, the
court held that CERCLA does not
define "owners" or "operators" as
including the parent company of
offending wholly-owned
subsidiaries."' Also, the court
concluded that the legislative history
did not indicate that Congress
intended to alter corporation law.""
The court relied primarily on the fact
that the parent corporation could not
automatically be deemed an "owner"
of an offending facility of its
subsidiary."" The Joslyn court
observed that the "normal rule of
statutory construction is that if
Congress intends for legislation to
change the interpretation of a
judicially created concept, it makes
that intent specific.""" The court
found nothing in the language of
CERCLA nor the legislative history
revealing a Congressional intent to
alter common law principles of
corporate liability."" The court
decided that without an expressed
Congressional directive to the
contrary, common-law principles of
corporation law, such as limited
liability, govern its analysis."' The
court noted "if Congress wanted to
extend liability to parent corporation it
could have done so, and it remains
free to do so.""' Thus, the Joslyn
court held that a parent corporation is
subject to liability only if the facts
justify piercing the corporate veil,
such that the subsidiary is the mere
alter ego of the parent corporation."'
In its recent decision, United
States v. Cordova Chemical Company
of Michigan, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed
with the Joslyn court."' In Cordova,
the Sixth Circuit determined that a
parent corporation is liable for the
environmental contamination of a site
owned by its subsidiary only if facts
exist which allow the corporate veil to
be pierced. The court reversed the
district court's holding that a parent
corporation is directly liable as an
"operator" under CERCLA §107(a).
Thus, the court adopted the narrow
view of operator liability for parent




""id. See also supra note 6.
"'Compare Idaho v. Bunker Hill Company, 635 F. Supp. 66795 (D. Idaho 1986) with United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d
24 (1 Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991).
"'
















pursuant to CERCLA, the
environmental damage occurred over
a period of decades and over several
ownership changes." In May and
June 1991, the district court
conducted a fifteen-day bench trial to
determine which parties were
responsible for the clean-up costs
related to pollution at the site."' The
district court found both CPC and
Aerojet liable as operators for the
disposal of hazardous substances that
occurred while their subsidiaries
operated the site."' The district court
concluded that a parent corporation is
directly liable under §107(a)(2) as an
operator when it has exerted power or
influence over its subsidiary by
actively participating in and exercising
control over the subsidiary's business
during a period of disposal of
hazardous waste."'
The central concern on
appeal was the criteria required under
CERCLA before a parent corporation
can be held financially liable for
pollution that occurred during the
ownership of a subsidiary."' The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
adopted a stricter standard than did
the district court for imposition of
such liability. The Sixth Circuit
concluded that a parent corporation
incurs operator liability pursuant to
§ I 07(a)(2) of CERCLA, for the
conduct of its subsidiary corporation,
only when the requirements necessary
to pierce the corporate veil are met. 2"
Therefore, the court reversed and
remanded the decision for further
proceedings.121
In reaching that decision, the
Sixth Circuit first reviewed the
remedial purpose of CERCLA.122 The
court observed that Congress enacted
CERCLA as a "remedial statute
designed to protect and preserve
public health and the environment."I 23
It noted that generally courts will not
interpret a remedial statute in a manner
that would frustrate the statute's
goals in the absence of specific
congressional intent to the contrary.'24
The court expressed that the goals of
Congress with respect to CERCLA
liability are difficult to discern, and
commented that even the district court
recognized, "some of CERCLA's
provisions are vague and its
legislative history sparse."' Thus,
the Cordova court reasoned that the
liability provision concerning
operators should be construed so that
financial responsibility for clean-up
operations falls upon those entities
who created the environmental
problem.126 In other words, the court
concluded that "the widest net
possible ought not be cast in order to
snare those who are either innocently
"
5Id. Beginning in 1957, chemicals were manufactured by a series of owners at a site located in Dalton Township, Michigan. The
initial owner, the Ott Chemical Company ("Ott I"), controlled the site from 1957 until 1965. The Ott Chemical Company ("Ott It"),
a wholly owned subsidiary of CPC International, Inc. ("CPC"), took over ownership of the site in 1965. In 1972, the Story Chemical
Company ("Story") acquired the site from Ott II and continued to operate it until 1977, when bankruptcy ended operations. Cordova
Chemical Company ("Cordova/California"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Aerojet-General Corporation ("Aerojet"), purchased the
site in 1977 from the Story bankruptcy trustee. Cordova Chemical Company of Michigan ("Cordova/Michigan"), a subsidiary of
Cordova/California, acquired ownership of the site in 1978. Cordova/Michigan retains ownership, although manufacturing operations
at the site ceased in 1986. Id. at 586-587.
"Id. at 586. Tests conducted in 1964 confirmed that the groundwater flowing underneath the site was contaminated. The principal
cause of the contamination was the use of unlined lagoons as a means of chemical waste disposal. This practice spanned the period
from 1959 until at least 1968. However, the lagoon seepage did not constitute the sole source of pollution that occurred during the
ownership of Ott I and Ott II. Chemical spills from train cars, from chemical drums, and from other sources resulted in further
contamination. From 1965 until 1974, purge wells were operated intermittently in an attempt to alleviate the groundwater pollution
problem. During the period that the Cordova companies owned and operated the site, waste was neither buried nor dumped into the
ground. Also, the unlined lagoons were no longer used as a means of chemical waste disposal. Cordova/Michigan discharged chemical
waste through off-site disposal or to a sewer that flowed to the Muskegon County treatment facility. Id. at 587.
"'Id. at 589. The district court rejected the contention that MDNR incurred liability as either an operator or as an arranger. Id. at 591.
Both Aerojet and Cordova/California were held liable as present owners of the site under §107(a)(1); Cordova/Califomia was held liable
as a former owner pursuant to §t07(a)(2). Id. at 592.
""CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 573 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
"
9Cordova, 59 F.3d at 586.
1201d. at 590.
"'Id. The appellate court did affirm the trial court's holding that MDNR was not liable as either an operator nor an arranger. Id. at
591. One judge of the Cordova court dissented. The dissenting judge concluded that a parent corporation may face potential liability
as an operator of a contaminating facility because the plain language of §107(a)(2) indicates that Congress intended to impose liability
on any entity actually operating a facility. Id. at 593-594.
"Id. at 588.
11Id. (citing Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 26.)
12Id.




or tangentially tied to the facility at
issue."'
Next, the Cordova court
stated that it was not persuaded that
Congress contemplated the
abandonment of traditional concepts
of limited liability associated with the
corporate form when enacting
CERCLA.129 It reached this decision
by reviewing two provisions of
CERCLA. First, the "owner or
operator" of an onshore facility is
defined as "any person owning or
operating such a facility.'" Second,
the court noted that when the facility
has been conveyed to the
government, the definition differs.'"
The definition then includes "any
person who owned, operated or
otherwise controlled activities at such
facility.""' The Cordova court
determined that the drafters of the
statute distinguished an operator from
a person who "otherwise controlled" a
facility."' Therefore, the court
concluded that when a parent
corporation actively participates in the
affairs of its subsidiary consistent
with the restrictions imposed by
traditional corporate law, nothing in
CERCLA indicates that the parent has
assumed the role of operator.'
In addition, the Cordova
court noted that the district court's
approach presented a number of
problems. First, it replaced the
relatively bright line provided by the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil,
which typically requires a fraudulent
purpose, with a nebulous "control"
test."' The court was concerned with
when, precisely, is a parent acting in a
manner consistent with its investment
relationship as opposed to in a
manner that triggers operator
liability.' The appellate court
concluded that the factors enumerated
by the district court, such as
participation in the subsidiary's board
of directors and involvement in
specific policy decisions, offered little
guidance."' The court noted that
those activities were not grounds
traditionally relied upon to pierce the
corporate veil.'"
The second problem the
court stated was that the threat of
unlimited liability would likely deter
private sector participation in the
cleanup of existing sites.' In the
Cordova case, the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources
("MDNR") actively sought a private
sector partner to take over and assist
in the remediation of the site.'3 9
Aerojet indicated an interest on the
condition that it could cap its
potential liability for environmental
cleanup, which it sought to
accomplish through the negotiation of
the agreement with the MDNR and the
use of subsidiaries."' The court
concluded that to restrain such
sensible and legitimate precautions in
favor of an unpredictable "control"
test would actually contravene the
public interest by discouraging
businesses from becoming involved in
such projects. 4'
b. Direct Liability
In the same year as the Fifth
Circuit decided Joslyn, the First
Circuit decided United States v.
Kayser-Roth Corp."' However,
despite the Fifth Circuit's decision
protecting limited liability, the First
Circuit asserted that a parent
corporation could be liable under
CERCLA for the acts of its subsidiary
as an "operator" of an offending
facility. In Kayser-Roth, the
government was seeking cleanup
costs from Kayser-Roth Corporation,
the parent company of Stamina Mills
Inc.' There, the court held that a
parent corporation could be held liable
as an operator of a subsidiary because
CERCLA was a remedial statute
designed to protect and preserve the
public health and the environment.'"
The court determined that CERCLA
must be construed liberally to avoid
frustration of its beneficial legislative
purpose.'4
In its opinion, the court
resolved that Congress, by including
a category in addition to owners,
implied that a person who is an
128Jd.
'42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii).
'"Cordova, 59 F. 3d at 589.
"'42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(iii).
'
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operator of a facility is not protected
from liability by the legal structure of
ownership.14 In addition, the
legislative history provided no
indication that Congress intended "all
persons" who are "operators" to
exclude parent corporations."' Thus,
the court determined that the statute
when viewed in accordance with its
legislative purpose and history
revealed no reason why a parent
corporation could not be held liable as
an operator under CERCLA." The
district court noted that for a company
to be an "operator" within the
statutory meaning it must have
"active involvement in the activities of
the subsidiary."'" Several factors
were relied upon in determining that
the parent exercised pervasive control
over the subsidiary: (I) monetary
control over accounts; (2) restriction
of subsidiary's financial budget; (3)
mandate that it conduct governmental
contact for the subsidiary; (4)
approval of the subsidiary's lease
arrangements; (5) approval of capital
transfers, and (6) placement of parent
personnel in many subsidiary director
and officer positions.' "
The First Circuit was not
persuaded by Joslyn.'" The court
determined that the Joslyn opinion
was concerned primarily with owner
rather than operator liability."s2 Also,
the court observed that the Joslyn
court framed its issue as whether to
"impose direct liability on parent
corporations for the violations of their
wholly owned subsidiaries."" The
court observed that Kayser is liable
for its activities as an operator not for
the activities of its subsidiary.'
Recently, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
Schiavone v. Pearce,' adopted the
Kayser-Roth theory. There, the court
decided that a parent corporation may
be liable under CERCLA for
environmental contamination caused
by a subsidiary if the parent exercised
sufficient control over the
subsidiary.' 6 The court recognized
that holding a parent independently
liable for the activities of a subsidiary
may not be consistent with traditional
rules of corporate liability, but
observed that such direct liablity is
nonetheless compatible with
CERCLA's goals. The court noted
that Congress enacted CERCLA with
the purpose of ensuring "that those
responsible for any damage,
environmental harm, or injury from
chemical poisons bear the costs of
their actions."' In addition, the
court stated that one of CERCLA's
primary goals is to extend liability to
all those involved in creating harmful
environmental conditions.'"
The Second Circuit found
support for imposing operator liability
directly on a parent corporation not
only from legislative intent, but also
from statutory language.'" The court
found the most compelling argument
to be Congress' inclusion of both
terms, "owner" and "operator.""'
The court determined that owner
liability is distinct from parent
operator liability.'"' The court stated,
"A finding of owner liability invokes
the parent-subsidiary relationship and
can be made only in circumstances
that permit corporate veil piercing."'"
However, the court concluded that
proof of operator liability looks to the
independent actions of the parent
corporation, evidenced through its
control over the polluting site.' An
additional justification raised by the
court was CERCLA's definition of
"person."" The court stated that
Congress, by defining "person"
broadly, indicated an intent to hold a
corporation liable for the
environmental violations of its
subsidiaries, if it is otherwise






'"Id. (citing Joslyn, 893 F2d at 81).
154Id.
"
5Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248 (2"' Cir. 1996).
''Id. The question of what control must be exercised by the parent corporation has received differing judicial responses. Some courts
require actual control to sustain a finding of operator liability. Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp., 4 E3d 1209,
1220 (3' Cir. 1993); Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27. Other courts deem merely the authority to control sufficient. Nurad, Inc. v.
William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 842 (4" Cir. 1992); United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 836-37
(4th Cir. 1992).
'-"Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 253. (quoting S. Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.A.A.N. 6119 and in I













All the circuits, except two,
that have addressed this issue have
found that a parent corporation is
directly liable under § 107(a)(2) without
regard to common law veil piercing."
At least three circuits have held that a
parent corporation may be held
directly liable as an operator under
§ I 07(a)(2) without any consideration
of veil-piercing.'" Two other circuits
held a parent corporation directly
liable as an operator not because the
parent corporation actually controlled
the subsidiary, but rather because it
had the authority to do so.'" In
addition, the Tenth Circuit applied the
Kayser-Roth standard to impose
operator liability on a company
director directly, and not under state
corporation law veil piercing
standards.'" It is only the Fifth
Circuit and the Sixth Circuit that
adopted a narrower view of operator
liability for parent corporations. 7"
IIL COMMENI
Cordova highlights the
ultimate issue which is whether
Congress intended to excuse a
corporate owner, officer, or director
who is in fact operating a
contaminating facility from direct
liability, if it is doing so in the name of
a corporation."' The majority of
federal circuit courts have ruled that if
the corporate owner exercises
sufficient control over the corporation
it may be liable under CERCLA for
environmental contamination caused
by the corporation."' The Fifth and
Sixth Circuits adhere to the narrower
veil-piercing rule that a corporate
owner is only liable if standards for
piercing the corporate veil are met."
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have not
ruled on specific issue of corporate
owner liability. This conflict reflects
the differing opinions on whether
Congress intended to alter the
common law principles of limited
liability when enacting CERCLA. One
of the basic tenets of corporate law is
limited liability. The law regards the
corporate owner as a legal entity
"separate and apart" from the
corporation.
The proposition that direct
liability for a corporation owner under
CERCLA §107(a) violates traditional
notions of limited liability is correct.
However, the enactment of CERCLA
was a reaction to an emergency
situation, which did not exist at the
time traditional notions of corporate
law were developed. CERCLA was
enacted to remediate the existence of
extensive environmental
contamination; and to protect and
preserve the public health and the
environment.
Limited liability fails to
achieve CERCLA's purposes. Veil-
piercing looks to factors such as fraud
and insufficient capitalization that do
not necessarily advance
environmental goals. It encourages
corporate owners to focus on
insulating themselves from the
corporation's actions rather than
taking steps to avoid polluting the
environment. Furthermore, since
corporation law varies from state to
state, observing the formalities each
state requires consumes valuable
resources.
Moreover, nothing in
CERCLA's language suggests that
Congress intended to exclude
corporate owners from operator
liability. "Person" is defined broadly
as a firm, a corporation, and a
commercial entity, among other
things." Furthermore, CERCLA is a
remedial statute and should be
construed broadly to include all
culpable parties. Thus, if a corporate
owner is found to be an operator-in-
fact, then CERLCA was meant to
provide direct liability upon that
individual.
Consequently, Congress
must have intended to alter the
common law principles of limited
liability when enacting CERCLA.
Otherwise, the purposes of the statute
to preserve and protect the public
interest and environment would not
be accomplished.
However, the conflict does
not end with whether to impose direct
or indirect liability. Courts imposing
the direct liability theory are in conflict
about the level of involvement the
corporate owner must exercise.
Operator, generator and transporter
direct liability under CERCLA have
been imposed by courts using three
different standards: authority to
control, personal participation ("actual
control"), and prevention.
In developing and
"id. at 594-595. (see, Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 24; Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Authority v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209
(3rd Cir. 1993); and Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bemuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107 (11 th Cir. 1993)).
"Id. at 595. (see Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4h Cir. 1992) and Kaiser Aluminum, 976 F.2d
1338 (9th Cir. 1992)).
'"Id. (see FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1993)).
"Old. (see Joslyn, 893 F.2d at 80 and Cordova, 59 F.3d at 584).
"'Cordova, 59 F.3d at 594.
"'See Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 24; Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 248; Landsford-Coaldale, 4 F.3d at 1209; Nurad, 966 F.2d at 837;
Sidney S. Arst Co.v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ., 25 F.3d at 417 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082
(8th Cir. 1995); and Jacksonville Elec., 996 F.2d at 1107.
" SeeJoslyn, 893 F.2d at 80 and Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 24.
"42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
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implementing the "actual control" test,
courts have not been consistent with
the policy of CERCLA. CERCLA was
enacted with a dual purpose: to
promptly cleanup hazardous waste
sites and to impose cleanup costs
onto responsible parties.'" The
statute itself does not contain a
causation standard, but instead states
that the standard of liability is to be
the same standard as that of the Clean
Water Act."' Prior to the enactment
of CERCLA, that standard had been
construed by the courts as one of
strict liability."
For instance, the actual
control test imposed by the Third
Circuit in U.S. v. USX is inconsistent
with the purposes of CERCLA."' The
test promotes the imposition of
liability onto some, but not others. In
the context of a close corporation
such as the White-Carite companies, it
is unlikely that given the nature of the
business they were engaged in, that
White and Carite did not know the
risks. For White and Carite to escape
liability merely because they did not
have any actual control over the
hazardous waste disposal decision
allows all future officers of close
corporations to escape liability merely
by hiring someone else to manage the
corporation. Congress enacted
CERCLA with the purpose of ensuring
that those repsonsible for any
damage, environmental harm, or injury
bear the costs of their actions. One of
its primary goals is to extend liability
to all those involved in creating
harmful environmental conditions.
But, the alternative authority
to control test may reach too far
across the boundaries of traditional
corporate law. One commentator has
explained the case of meeting the
authority to control test as:
Every parent corporation, by
virtue of the power it wields
over its subsidiary, could
control that subsidiary's
activities, including those
activities relating to its
environmental matters and
the operation of a facility. A
literal application of the
capacity to control test
would thus lead to a finding
of parent liability in every
case involving a CERCLA
violation by a subsidiary.'"
Thus, perhaps the prevention test
articulated by the ARCO court is an
excellect compromise."" Under this
standard, liability is imposed upon a
corporate owner, officer, or director
when that individual could have
prevented or significantly abated the
release of hazardous substances."'
This test prompts corporate
individuals to become involved with
hazardous waste disposal decisions
because the test weighs any efforts
taken to avoid or alleviate the harm,
whether or not successful, in
assessing liability."12 The prevention
test furthers CERCLA's purposes by
encouraging corporate individuals to
become involved, rather than closing
their eyes to potential violations.
In conclusion, courts should
hold corporate owners, officers, and
directors directly liable under
CERCLA § 107 because adhering to
the notions of limited liability fails to
achieve the purposes of CERCLA.
Nothing in the language of CERCLA
suggests that Congress' definitions of
"operator" and "person" excluded
corporate owners, officers, or
directors. Furthermore, courts should
apply the prevention test to determine
if the individual is in fact operating,
generating, or transporting. This test
promotes fairness because corporate
individuals are shielded from liability
so long as they take steps to prevent
environmental violations."'3 Also, the
test promotes safety because
corporate individuals will carefully




The Supreme Court has
previously denied certiorari to
consider this issue in Joslyn"' and
Kayser-Roth.1'1 However, it should
not be acceptable for federal courts to
be operating under different
interpretations of CERCLA, a federal
'"General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415. 1422 (8P Cir. 1990),cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937
(1991).
1-42 U.S.C. § 9601(32).
"Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENvL. AFF. L. REv. 579, 599




'Lynda J. Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and Operator Analysis Under CERCLA: Finding Order In The Chaos Of Pervasive
Control, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 223, 260 (1994).
"'ARCO, 723 F. Supp. at 1214.
"''Id. at 1220.
"I2 d.
"'Richard S. Farmer, Parent Corporation Responsibility for the Environmental Liabilities of the Subsidiary: A Search for the
Appropriate Standard, 19 J. CORP. L. 769, 801 (1994).
'"Id.
)'498 U.S. 1108 (1991).
"'498 U. S. 1084 (1991).
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statute enacted to create uniform
environmental control and regulation.
Courts have used three approaches to
address corporate owner liability
undcrCERCLA §107." Somecourts
have analyzed corporate owner
liability indirectly as owners." Other
courts have analyzed corporate owner
liability directly as operators.'"
Finally, still another court has anlyzed
corporate owner liability indirectly as
an operator?"1 The use of three
different approaches to analyze the
same issue, and the resulting
unsettled case law illustrates the
confusion and inadequacy of the
direct/indirect liability in its present
state.'I
In addition, the holding of
Cordova highlights the inconsistency
when piercing the corporate veil. The
Cordova court applied state veil-
piercing laws.w2 Some courts apply
state standards for veil-piercing, while
other courts apply federal standards
for veil-piercing. It would be wise to
eliminate this inconsistency by
mandating that all courts apply direct
liability under CERCLA. Then, all
courts would be applying the same
standard, resulting in uniformity.
Also, a uniform federal standard
would eliminate forum shopping by
eliminating the benefit of considering
each state's veil piercing standards
before deciding where to file suit.'
The next time this issue comes before
the Supreme Court, the Court should
grant certiorari and assert a uniform
rule of law.
'"John M. Brown, Parent Corporation's Liability Under CERCLA Section 107 for the Environmental Violations of Their Subsidiaries,
31 TuLSA L. J. 819, 837 (1996).
'"See Joslyn, 837 F.2d at 80.
'"See Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 24.
'-See Cordova, 59 F.3d at 584.
1
91Brown, supra note 187, at 837.
'
2Cordova, 59 F.3d at 591. During rehearing, the Sixth Circuit is deciding what, if any, role state corporate law should play in
determining liability. 1995 DEN 237 dl7.
"Brown, supra note 187, at 838.
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